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TH MACINTOSH CASE
As a result of the refusal of a world-war Canadian Army chaplain, at
present serving as a Baptist minister and divinity school professor, to
give the United States carte blanche for his services in any and all future
wars, the United States Supreme Court has decided to consider again the
propriety of denying citizenship because of a foreign applicant's unwilling-
ness to agree to bear arms. In the case to be reviewed,' the applicant
when asked by a naturalization examiner whether he was "willing" to
take up arms in defense of this country declared himself willing to do
so only if he should be free to judge the necessity of the war, since
he "could not put allegiance to the government of any country before
allegiance to the will of God." The Federal District Court of Connecticut
in the now famous case of United Statcs v. Macintosh2 deemed such a
qualification of the applicant's allegiance to the constitution sufficient
grounds for a denial of citizenship. But the fact that the refusal was not
absolute and was grounded upon religious rather than pacifistic objection
to bearing arms led the Circuit Court of Appeals to reverze the decision
of the District Court and distinguish the instant case from Unitcd States v.
Schwimmer 3 which the lower court had regarded as controlling.
1 United States v. Macintosh, 42 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930; cer-
tiorari granted, 51 Sup. Ct. 90 (1930). Cf. Bland v. United States, 42 F.
(2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); certiorari granted, 51 Sup. Ct. 90 (1920),
in which the same circuit court held that a world war nurse, the daughter
of a Canadian episcopalian minister, was entitled to citizenship despite
her qualification of the oath of allegiance by a statement that she was
unwilling to bear arms in any war but would promise to defend the con-
stitution as far as her conscience would allow. But cf. In re Clarke, 152
Atl. 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1930), -here an applicant was refused citizenship
-when he sought to qualify the oath by a declaration that he would support
and defend the constitution and laws of the United States "so far as they
are in accord with the moral law of Jesus Christ."
2 Supra note 1.
3 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448 (1929). The Supreme Court affirmed
(three judges dissenting) the denial of citizenship to a woman pacifist
and atheist, found to have "no sense of nationalism," who absolutely refused
to bear arms. The Schimmer decision is disapproved in Note (1929) 7
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rsv. 157; (1930) 28 Mic. L. REv. 445 (citing the selective
service act as indicating that pacificism and conscientious objection to mili-
tary service are not contrary to the principles of the constitution) ; (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 673 (approving grant of citizenship by lower court); se
Bromley, The Pacifist Bogey (1930) 161 HARPERs 553; (1929) NEw REPUB-
Lic 236; (1929) 152 OUTLOOK 250; (1929) 129 NATION 30; ibid, 615; (1929)
46 CHnmsTiAw CENTURY 491; (1930) ibid. 212. Contra: (1929) 16 VA. L. RPv.
173; (1930) 3 So. CALiF. L. REv. 224; (1929) 3 CuN. L. REv. 462; cf. (1930)
7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 723; (1929) 23 Am. J. INT. LAw 783. Opposite re-
actions to the Schwimmer ease are well illustrated by two bills introduced
into congress after that decision. One proposed law, introduced in the
House of Representatives, [H. R. 3547 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.)]
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The naturalization rules require only that an applicant take an oath
to "support and defend the constitution" and "show attachment to the
principles of the constitution" and nowhere expressly make a willingness
to bear arms a prerequisite of citizenship. 4 Yet one of the by-products of
the war has been the practice of requiring applicants to demonstrates
their readiness both to "defend the constitution" and manifest adherence
to its "principles" by taking up arms. Prior to the Schwtimncr case,
a few district courts lent their approval to this practice and held that a
declaration of an absolute unwillingness to bear arms in all future wars
was inconsistent with the oath to support and defend the constitution
despite the declared willingness of the applicant to serve in a non-combatant
capacity.G After the Schwimmer case one court went to the extreme of
sustaining a refusal to grant citizenship to a registered nurse who was
ready to serve as such to soldiers at the front but unwilling to kill in any
war.7 And still another tribunal gave its support to a similarly grounded
denial of citizenship to the American born wife of a Norwegian pastor
even though her husband, with a like attitude toward the bearing of arms,
had been granted citizenship prior to the practice of inquiring into an
applicant's views on this subject.8
provided that no person be debarred from citizenship by reason of religious
views or philosophical opinions with respect to war; and another intro-
duced in the Senate, [1506 (70th Cong. 1st Sess.)] proposed that before
admission to citizenship the applicant should swear that when called upon
he would bear arms in defense of the United States. See (1929) 23 Ar.
J. INT. LAW 780.
434 STAT. 596 (1906), 8 U. S. C. §§ 381, 382 (1926).
5 The burden of proving adherence to the principles of the constitution
is upon the applicant. The legal ground for the Schwimmer decision was
that the applicdnt had failed to sustain this burden of proof. When doubt
exists whether the burden has been met, it has been said such doubts should
be resolved against the claimant. United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463,
48 Sup. Ct. 328 (1928) ; cf. In re Vasicek, 271 Fed. 326 (E. D. Mo. 1921) ;
see United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 475, 37 Sup. Ct. 422 (1917).
But there is apparently a wide divergence of opinion as to what are the
"principles of the conslitution" to which the prospective citizen must show
himself to be attached and which he must show himself willing to defend
and support. Compare Ex parte Sauer, 81 Fed. 355 (D. Tex. 1891)
(belief in socialism grounds for denial of citizenship) and United States
v. Olson, 4 F. (2d) 417 (W. D. Wash. 1925) (I. W. W. member refused
citizenship) with United States v. Rovin, 12 F. (2d) 942 (E. D. Mich. 1926)
(belief in changes of form of government no evidence of lack of attach-
ment to constitutional principles) and Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40
Sup. Ct. 499 (1920) (Supreme Court held constitutional a scheme for
manufacturing and marketing farm products under government auspices).
Also compare In re Vasicek, supra (petitioner excluded because unable
to define "anarchist") and In re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337 (W. D. Tex. 1897)
(attachment to constitution sufficient even though applicant "lamentably
ignorant" and "unable to read and write" and deficient in the power to
elucidate and define the principles of the constitution).
0 In re Roeper; 274 Fed. 490, 491 (D. Del. 1921); In re D-., 290
Fed. 863, 864 (W. D. Ohio 1923). See also State ex rel. Weisz v. District
Court, 61 Mont. 427, 202 Pac. 387 (1921). See Note (1923) 22 MxiIO.
L. REV. 152.
7 See BLAND V. UNITED STATES, supra note 1.
8 See Bromley, op. cit. supra note 3; (1930) 46 CHRISrIAN CENTURY 493.
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There appears to be no stern necessity compelling either the courts or
the naturalization boards to construe the naturalization statutes as requir-
ing that one desirous of becoming a citizen declare himself ready to become
a soldier. Indeed, with respect to those already citizens, the state depart-
ment has refused to interpret the oath to "support and defend the con-
stitution," which is required of passport applicants, as necessarily imply-
ing defense by bearing arms.9 And the demand that an applicant for
citizenship evidence his attachment to the principles of the constitution
by a willingness to bear arms irrespective of religious scruples hardly
squares with the sanction accorded by both the original constitutional con-
vention 10 and state I" and national - enactments to those already citizens
whose religious beliefs cause them to refuse to participate in military
service. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in the Schwimmer case, it cannot be supposed that Congress be-
lieved women should have to bear arms, and certainly Congress did not
intend, by this indirect method, to exclude all women from naturalization.
9 See BoECKEL, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE (1928) 304, 30G-307.
1oAt the time of the drafting of the constitution and the amendments
constituting the "Bill of Rights," provision that "no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service
in person" was discussed and it was probably only an unavoidable com-
promise in language and a desire for brevity which brought about the
adoption of the more general language of the first amendment. See 1 GLES,
ANNALs OF CONGRESS (1st Cong.) 434, 729, 731; STORY, CONSTITUTION
(5th ed. 1891) § 801. The terms of ratification of the constitution by the
thirteen original states indicate that they considered that one with con-
scientious scruples against bearing arms should be exempt, at least upon
payment of an equivalent to employ another in his stead. 13 JOURNALS
or CONGRESS 174, 176 (Va.); ibid 185-187 (N. C.); ibid 170-172 (N. H.).
"Among the thirteen original colonies, not only were Quakers and the
like exempted from military service but those with conscientious objections
against war were permitted to obtain a substitute or pay a tax. 4 MErc,%LF
273, 274 (N. H.); 4 COLONIAL L.WS 17 (N. Y.); 24 STAT. RECorMS 193,
358 (N. C.); 4 M.Ass. ACTS & RESOL1ES 158, c. 3 (1758-1759); 5 HENYNG'S
STAT. AT LARGE 16 (Va.); 13 PA. STAT. AT LARGE 41.
The following state statutes have specifically provided that persons with
conscientious or religious scruples need not bear arms. IOWA CODE (1897)
770 §§2167, 2169; KY. AcTs (1916) 432, 472, 476-477; LA. ACTS (1912)
337 n. 191 § 1; ibid. acts (1915-1916) 540-548 § 3; MTE. REV. STAT.
(1916) 296-297, 299, c. 15 §§ 1, 2, 10; MICH. STATS. (Howell 2d ed.)
§ 1508-1590; MINN. LAWS (1916-1917) c. 400, §§ 2, 7; 1 OKLA. REv. LAws
(1917) c. 46; R. I. Pun. LAWS (1909) c. 374, § 1, 2; 1 S. C. CODE (1912)
§§ 494;495; WYo, SESs. LAWS (1917) c. 107 §§ 1, 20. Statutes in most of
the other states provide that those exempted by the laws of the United
States shall likewise be exempted under the state laws. Still other states
have constitutional provisions that "any person who conscientiously scruples
to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so but shall pay an equivalent for
personal service." Ala., Ark., Colo., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ran., Ky., La.,
Me., Md., Mich., Miss., Mo., N. H., N. Y., N. C., Pa., S. C., and Vt.
12 STAT. 731, § 13 (1863) (army substitute or $300 tax); 13 STAT. 4,
§ 17 (1864) (alternative of hospital duty); 32 STAT. 775 (1903) (full
exemption); 39 STAT. 197 § 59, 32 U. S. C. § 3 (1916) (all persons who
because of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service shall
be exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity but not from
non-combatant service); 40 STAT. 76, 50 U. S. C. 165 (1917) (Selective
Draft Act-non combatant service).
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Even without specific constitutional or legislative sanction, one already
possessed of citizenship would appear to be privileged under the guaranty
of religious freedom contained in the first amendment to refuse to bear
arms if it ran counter to religious scruples1 5 And the instant court insists
that a citizen possessed of religious scruples against bearing arms in what
he regards as a morally "unjustified" war is only asserting an inalienable
right of conscience "which the citizen need not surrender and which the
government or society cannot take away."14 Assuming that a native
born citizen cannot be compelled to take up arms when the refusal is
based upon conscientious scruples15 the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Macintosh case seems justified. To exact of an alien as
a condition of naturalization a promise that he will relinquish a privilege
of a native born citizen would create two classes of citizens with unequal
privileges whereas the constitution clearly contemplates that all citizens,
both native born and naturalized, shall enjoy identical privileges with the
exception of presidential eligibilty.16
13 See State v. Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, 46 S. D. 189, 207, 191
N. W. 635, 641 (1922), in which the court said: "The Congress of the
United States, recognizing the constitutional rights of persons to adhere
to conscientious conviction, as non-combatants in time of war enacted sec-
tion 4 c. 15, Act May 18, 1917, and section 2, c. 166, Act Aug. 31, 1918
(U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 2044d)
with a proviso exempting such persons from the provisions of the selective
draft. . ?' See Draft and Militia Acts, supra note 12, and Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1917) ; and see notes 10 and 11.
Of course it may be argued that the guarantee of religious liberty cannot
be invoked by those seeking to commit an overt act against the peace,
good order and morals of society. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 (1878) (polygamy); Sharper v. Lyle, 30 F. (2d) 971 (W. D. Wash.
1929) (use of liquor in violation of prohibition act). But religious groups
whose members are committed to non-participation in war have been held
not "inimical to or in contravention of public policy or good morals." State
v. Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, supra; see Bromley, op. cit. supra, note 3,
at 562.
14 See opinion of Manton, J., 42 F. (2d) at 844. This argument is appar-
ently based upon a theory of "natural rights." Of. HAINES, Tim RsVIVAL
Ov NATURAL LAW CowC sPTs (1930).
. 15 It might be argued that only members of those sects which have taken
a definite stand against war are included within the exemptions from
compulsory military service. The distinction, however, seems doubtful. See
Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 300 (1890), in which
Field, J. defined religion as referring to "one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being
and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with the
cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from
the latter."
16 Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 13 (1913) ; See Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884); Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135 (1892);
Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738 (1824); Dredd Scott v. Sandford,
19 How. 393 (U. S. 1856) ; Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393 ( U. S. 1830). While
citizenship by naturalization is said to be a privilege and not a right,
once the conditions of naturalization have been complied with, the applicant
has a legal right to become a citizen. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S.
568, 46 Sup. Ct. 425 (1926); United States v. Shanahan, 232 Fed. 169
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Of course the real issue involved in the MacIntoSh case is the fundamental
conflict between ihe right of the individual as a member of the state to
think and act according to the dictates of conscience and the right of the
state to superimpose its ideas of right and wrong. If the state is to survive,
activity that is plainly detrimental to its exdstence cannot be permitted;1r
but in the light of American history and philosophy it would seem that a
sincere religious objection to some or all wars is not inconsistent with good
citizenship and allegiance to the principles of the constitution.' s By the
Kellogg Pact, the American government has itself solemnly renounced war
as an instrument of national policy; that pact -will indeed become an empty
gesture if citizens are not to be permitted freedom of conscience in deter-
mining for themselves whether their government has fulfilled its obligations.
FREEDom OF LEGIsLATIoN AGAINST FREEDnit OF CONTICT
A F RE insurance company contracts to pay a New Jersey insurance broker
the reasonable value of its services as an agent. The broker bills the
company for twenty-five per cent of the premiums on policies sold, and
upon receipt of only twenty per cent brings suit to collect the balance.
In answer, the company shows that it has been paying but a twenty per
cent commission to other of its New Jersey agents, and points to a New
Jersey statute limiting fire insurance rates and commissions to "reason-
able" figures and specifically forbidding any company to pay an agent
in the state a greater commission than that paid to any other agent of
the company in the state. The broker asserts that compliance with the
statute will work a deprivation of the freedom of contract guaranteed
against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitu-
tional issue thus raised brings the case before the United States Supreme
Court.
One familiar with recent Supreme Court pronouncements affecting legis-
lative attempts to regulate the terms of business contracts' would have
(D. C. Pa. 1916); United States v. Jorgenson, 241 Fed. 412 (D. C. Mich.
1916); of. United States v. Manzi, supra note 5.
17 It would seem that a line could be "pricked out" between opinions
such as those expressed by the applicants in the Bland and Macintosh
cases, and overt acts like those condemned in the following cases: Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); Davis v. Beason,
supra note 15 (polygamy); Shenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup.
Ct. 247 (1919) (distribution of pamphlets urging resistance to the Draft
Acts) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1919)
(speaking against the war and distructing recruiting). The decision in
the Schwimmer ease may be distinguished from the principal case as an
attempt to prevent this type of behavior.
i See Lincoln's criticism of the Mexican War, 2 BEVERDGE, LiFE OF
LiNCOLN (5th ed. 1928) 424. See also account of Mr. Justice Stone's report
after an official investigation of conscientious objectors under the Wilson
Administration, in which he stated that "both sound moral and social policy
require that the state should not violate the conscience of the individual...
all our history gives confirmation of the view that liberty of conscience
has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at
the hands of the state." EDDY, THE ABOLITION OF WAR (1924) 89.
1E.g. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1904);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1914); Tyson v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350,
48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928) ; cases cited infra note 14.
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been bold to predict that the Court, faced with the given facts, should
have refused to question the constitutionality of the statute and afflrmed
a judgment for the defendant insurance company, as it did in O'Gornman
& Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,2 handed down a few weeks ago.
For the Court of late has been zealous to guard against legislative inter-
ference the contractual freedom which it sees as part of the "liberty" and
"property" that the Fourteenth Amendment guards against deprivation
"without due process of law." 3 The assertion that a state act restricts the
right of contract and thus offends the Fourteenth Amendment is an easy
device for bringing the statute within the scope of Supreme Court review;
it is scarcely, on its face, a rebuttal of the axiomatic presumption that any
enacted statute is valid.4 But opinions phrased in the lingo of constitu-
tional rights have magnified the logic of the procedural device at the
expense of the argument inherent in the axiom.5 And a habit of expression
has crystallized into a practical presumption of unconstitutionality, taking
form as soon as a regulatory law is charged with violating the liberty
of contract.6 Faced with this presumption, the champions of the new law
have had to justify its enactment with aggressive factual arguments,'
unable to rely on the simple rule that a statute is good until it is proven
bad. And even where the Court has been persuaded to permit the legisla-
tion, it has carefully qualified its acquiescence as an exception to the rule
of non-interference with contract rights, made in deference to the "police
2 U. S. Daily, Jan. 6, 1931, at 3354, and Jan. 7, 1931, at 3373.
S "Included in the right of personal liberty and the ight of privatq
property-partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make contracts
for the acquisition of property." Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 1, at 14,
35 Sup. Ct. at 243. Cf. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39
YAz L. J. 1089, 1090 (1930), where it is pointed out that the Court has
been most rigid in dealing with statutes concerned with the dollar item
of private contracts.
4The rules that any judicial doubt must be resolved in favor of the
disputed statute, and that the burden of proof is on the one who would
overthrow the statute are corollaries of the presumption of constitutionality.
For a collection of statements of these principles, see Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law 1893 7 HAnV. L,.
REv. 129, 143 n.1.
5 It is significant that in the "freedom of contract" cases expression of
the axiom is so frequently found in the dissenting opinions. Of. Holmes,
J., dissenting in Lochner v. New York, Tyson v. Banton, both supra note
1, and in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 625, 667, 43 Sup. Ct.
394, 404 (1992).
6 Cf.: "But freedom of contract is ... the general rule and restraint the
exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be
justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances." Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, supra note 5, at 546, 43 Sup. Ct. at 397.
SReference is to the use of the economic or "Brandeis" brief, initiated
by the present Justice as counsel in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28
Sup. Ct. 324 (1908), and since employed with increasing regularity. Such




power" of the regulating state 8 or the "affectation with a public interest"
of the regulated business.0
Mr. Justice Brandeis,10 speaking for the Court in the O'Gorman case,
is not unaware of the habitual technique of adjudication. He neither fails
to cite the German Alliance Insurance Co. case21 as evidence that the
insurance business is affected with a public interest, nor does he neglect
to mention in passing the applicability of the "police power" concept. But
he bases the decision in no uncertain terms on the absence of affimative
proof that the statute is not an appropriate remedy for existent evils.
Nothing in the mere recital of a private grievance in constitutional language
induces him to question the presumed wisdom of legislators. Moreover,
he sees regulation as in no sense unrelated to the recognized evils in the
conduct of the insurance business,2 and excessive commissions as in no
degree foreign to the danger of either high rates or financial instability
in the insurer. It can scarcely pass unnoticed that in postulating the
validity of the statute on the very action of the legislature, in the face
of the "freedom of contract" plea, he cites no cases.
Four members of the Court, in an elaborate argument characterized
as a "separate opinion," express their disagreement with the Court's de-
cision. Consideration of the case from the traditional angle leads Justices
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler to the inevitable con-
clusion that the statute is bad. Speaking with the emphasis of a united
front,13 they see the New Jersey law as a clear infringement of that right
of private contract which the Court has "steadfastly upheld" throughout
a line of decisions ranging from Adair v. United Statci to Ribnil v. ilfc-
Bride.'4 Without swerving from their approach to the case through the
avenue of previous holdings, they distinguish it from the German Alliance
Insurance Co. case and minimize any reasonable relationship between brok-
ers' commissions and insurance rates. Their attention focussed on freedom
of contract, they visualize the harmful effects upon business dealings which
will result from a law so indefinite, so arbitrary, and so new. Their argu-
ment, once started from the Fourteenth Amendment, ticks with clock-like
precision to its certain conclusion.
Yet it is not because he argues from a different major premise that
8 Cf. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206 (1909) ; Bunt-
ing v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1924).
9 Cf. German Aliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612 (1914).
30 With -whom concur Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Holmes, Stone,
and Roberts.
2iSupra note 9.
12It may be noted that reference is made in the opinion to the Report
of the Insurance Investigating Committee, (N. Y. 1906), for which the
present Chief Justice -was largely responsible.
33 The minority view is reported as "the separate opinion of Mr. Justice
Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Sutherland, and Mr.
Justice Butler,"-an interesting departure from the usual method of
presentation.
14 The list of cases, as cited, is "Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S.
525, 545, 546 [cf. supra note 6]; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,
174, 175; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.
332; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312,
338; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262
U. S. 522; Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra [sic]; Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U. S. 350; Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 111."
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Mr. Justice Brandeis reaches a different decision. He might similarly have
come at the problem from its case-law background, and found a dividing
line between the O'Gorman facts and those of earlier cases decided in
terms of the freedom of contract. He might have recognized the logic
of the non-concurring justices and countered it with citation of the Court's
unanimous decision in Tagg Bros & Morehead v. United Statcs,15 wherein
may be found direct authority for the regulation of agents' compensation
and a neat distinction between fixing pay and fixing a rate of pay.1O
Instead he chose to shift the burden of proof at the very beginning by
requiring a refutation of presumptive legislative reasonableness to defeat
the statute, rather than a justification of interference with contract rights
to support it. Whether there may be found, in this exchange of roles by
presuinpion and refutation, the germs of a new technique in the Supreme
Court review of regulatory legislation can only be determined by the
manner of future decisions." The argument of the four justices, in its
strict adherence to verbal precedent, is still good law. But there is another
way of reasoning whereby the rigor of legal logic is neither blindly sub-
served nor carelessly ignored, but is directed, by the manipulation of major
premises, to whatever end seems most in keeping with the broad interests
of governmental policy. And in this sense, the argument of the Court is
good law, and also good statesmanship.
Loss RECOVERABLE UNDER CONTRACT INDEMNIFYING BANK FOR PAYMIENTS
OF INVALID CHECKS
INDEMNITY against losses sustained by banks through the payment of
invalid checks is a recent addition to the many types of protection now
offered to all kinds of enterprise.1 Policies of this sort in force in 1931
are conservatively estimated to represent a liability of several billion dol-
lars.2 Nevertheless, such policies, first written in any considerable amount
1 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1930). It is true that this case was
concerned with an administrative order made under a Federal statute.
But the Court has not been over-meticulous in setting a dividing line
between direct and indirect legislative regulation, or between the Fifth
2 Inquiry reveals the great extent of this type of insurance. One com-
and the Fourteenth Amendments, where freedom of contract is involved.
In the instant case, for example, the minority, in quoting from the Adkins
case, feel free to bracket "of the Fourteenth Amendment" as an explana-
tory interposition after a reference to the due process clause, although the
text from which they quote was specifically concerned with the Fifth
Amendment.16 The opinion in the Tagg case was also the work of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. 1
17 Distinct evidence of a similar tendency to cut through case-law back-
ground in considering problems of a like nature may be found in several
Supreme Court opinions handed down within the past year. Cf. Corpora-
tion Commission of Oklahoma v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 50 Sup. Ct. 397
(1930) and Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 282; Texas & N. 0. R. R.
v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup.
Ct. 427 (1930) and Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 92; Willcuts v. Bunn,
U. S. Daily, Jan. 6, 1931, at 3357; Educational Film Corp. v. Ward, U.
S. Daily, Jan. 13, 1931, at 3441. But of. United States v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R., U. S. Daily, Jan. 6, 1931, at 3354; with
which compare the dissenting opinion of Stone, J., in the same case, U. S.
Daily, Jan. 7, 1931, at 3370.
1 See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 39.
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not ten years ago,3 do not appear to have been before the courts, and the
recent case of Phoenix NVational Bank & Trust Co. v,. Aotna Casualty &
Surety Co.,4 questioning the nature of the loss recoverable thereunder, is
apparently correctly called one of first impression.
The policy there sued on indemnified the plaintiff bank against "any
loss sustained . . . through the payment . . . of forged or raised checks
or (genuine) checks bearing forged indorsements." Checks of that de-
scription were paid by the plaintiff and charged to the account of a cor-
poration depositor. Since the officer of the corporation examining the
cancelled checks and monthly statements was the wrongdoer, no notice of
the fraud was given the bank until over a year later. At that time, the
plaintiff voluntarily and over the objection of the defendant casualty com-
pany recredited the depositor with the amount of the invalid checks. The
appellate court indicated that the "loss" indemnified included payments
made under the compulsion of business expediency as well as of the law,
and held that honoring the checks constituted "loss" under the contract,
fixing once and for all the defendant's liability. Reversing the trial court,
judgment was entered for the bank.
Contracts of indemnity have generally been so construed as to relieve
the indemnitor from the payment of losses which could have been avoided,
diminished or recouped elsewhere by the indemnitee.5 Under this rule the
release of a person ultimately liable for the loss has been held to discharge
the indemnitor pro tanto.D And although the indemnitee is not required of
his own motion to take all possible measures to recoup a loss already in-
curred,7 the indemnitor may usually be held, subject to the express terms
pany had a total of four claims presented in 1922; it estimates the total
number of claims made to it to date under the forgery clauses to be in
excess of eight thousand. Another of the large companies has undertaken
a drive for $2,000,000 premiums by June of this year and there is said to be
every indication of success; this would mean a liability limit of about
$100,000,000. Even so, it is estimated that only about 15% of the forgery
losses in the country are covered. Further growth of such indemnity seems
highly probable.
3 Forgery coverage was first offered in Banker's Blanket Bonds, when
in 1921 the Surety Association of America drafted its "Form 8 Bond"
which insured only transactions involving checks. This was the contract
in the case here considered. Shortly thereafter appeared Blanket Forgery
and Alteration Bonds, Banker's Limited Forgery Bonds and Securities
Blanket Bonds. The "Form 8 Bond" was revised in 1928; as now sold with
its supplementary form, protection is given to banks in all paper trans-
actions excepting those involving traveller's checks and the discounting of
promissory notes.
444 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
5Names v. Dwelling House Insurance Co., 95 Iowa 642, 64 N. W. 628
(1895)'; ANsoN, CONTRAcTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 245; VANCE, op. cit. cupra
note 1, at §§ 175-177; Note (1928) 28 CoL L. REv. 202.
6 Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216 (1895) (indorser-indemnitee
released maker); Iowa Bonding and Casualty Co. v. Wagner Co., 203 Iowa
179, 210 N. W. 775 (1926) (creditor-indemnitee discharged debtor in com-
promise).
7 Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 260, 105 AUt. 687 (1919) ; Abraham-
son v. Burnett, 290 Pac. 228 (Wash. 1930); of. Anderson v. Reed, 133 Okla.
23, 270 Pac. 854 (1928). This perhaps is an answer to the second defense
raised by the defendant which was based on the plaintiff's refusal to proceed
against the responsible indorsers on the checks.
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of the contract,8 only for such actual loss 9 as the indemnitee was under
a legal duty to pay.l0 The voluntary nature of the payment of the loss
does not necessarily preclude recovery," but the indemnitee is then required
to show that there was no defense to the claim.2 To bind the indemnitor
by a judgment holding invalid the indemnitee's defense to suit on a claim
brought against him, the latter must give notice of the pending suit.' 3
Further, under penalty of releasing the indemnitor entirely, he is required
diligently to assert,14 or to allow and aid the indemnitor to assort,1 5 any
reasonable defense to his alleged liability. In the present case there was
such a reasonable defense. When a depositor demands recredit for forged
or raised checks charged to his account, the bank may show that the de-
positor failed to give reasonable notice of the forgeries which examination
of the vouchers and statements revealed 10 or should have revealed 1 T to
the depositor. In determining the sufficiency of the notification, a depositor
8 Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bassett, 133 Wash. 77, 233 Pac. 325 (1925) ;
Illinois Surety Co. v. Maguire, 157 Wis. 49, 145 N. W. 768 (1914) ; Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Hibbler, 177 Mich. 490, 143 N. W. 604 (1913).
9 Southern Surety Co. v. Sheldon, 33 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
(guaranty of buyers' agreement to build on land purchased under deed of
trust, failure to build insufficient without showing loss on foreclosure);
Duke v. Tyler, 230 N. W. 319 (Iowa 1930) (indemnity against loss by
defect in title of land purchased, unmarketability because of defect insuffi-
cient). Indemnities against liability are to be distinguished. Of. North v.
North & Son, Inc., 93 N. J. L. 438, 108 Atl. 244 (1919).
10 Belmont Coal & Railroad Co. v. Smith, 74 Ala. 206 (1883); Rosco
Trading Co. v. Pringle & Co., 111 Misc. 605, 182 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Sup. Ct.
1920) (indemnity against loss by defective packing of goods sold to dealer,
uncontested payment by indemnitee of rebate claimed by consumer); Ore-
gon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington Tire & Rubber
Co., 126 Wash. 565, 219 Pac. 9 (1923) (indemnity against loss through
maintenance of spur for indemnitor, payment to employee for injuries
caused only by indemnitor's negligence); cf. Tolleson v. Jennings, 60 Arl.
190, 29 S. W. 276 (1895) (indemnity against loss as indorser, indemnitee
paid by contribution to maker).
"Nixon v. Beard, 111 Ind. 137, 12 N. E. 131 (1887) ; Walton v. Chero-
kee Colliery Co., 70 W. Va. 48, 72 S. E. 63 (1911).
12 Belmont Coal & Railroad Co. v. Smith, supra note 10; Eva v. Andersen,
166 Cal. 420, 137 Pac. 16 (1913) ; New York Central & Hudson River R. R.
v. Stuart & Sons Co., 260 Mass. 242, 157 N. E. 540 (1927).
'. Gorman v. Williams, 117 Iowa 560, 91 N. W. 819 (1902) ; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Paulk, 15 S. W. (2d) 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
See National Surety Co. v. Love, 105 Neb. 38, 43, 178 N. W. 917, 915
(1920), 105 Neb. 855, 859, 182 N. W. 490, 492 (1921).
'4 Gorman v. Williams, supra note 13 (indemnitee neglected to prosecute
appeal) ; Lothrop v. Blake, 3 Pa. 483 (1846).
' 5s City of New York v. Baird, 176 N. Y. 269, 68 N. E. 364 (1903) (over
objection, indemnitee settled and dismissed appeal from adverse judgment);
Cf. Mayor of New York City v. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank, 130 App.
Div. 748, 115 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1909) (indemnitor need not proceed
-with appeal Vwhen indemnitee settles and refuses to proceed therewith).
16 England National Bank v. United States, 282 Fed. 121 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922); National Surety Co. v. Stockyards National Bank, 84 Colo. 563, 272
Pac. 470 (1928).
17 General Cigar Co. v. First National Bank, 290 Fed. 143 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923); Stumpp v. Bank of New York, 212 App. Div. 608, 209 N. Y. Supp.
396 (1st Dep't 1925).
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who innocently delegates the examination to a dishonest agent is held to
have such knowledge of the forgery as would have been revealed either
through examination by an honest agent ' s or through reasonable super-
vision of the dishonest agent's examination.10
In the instant case the final incidence on bank or depositor of the loss
that occurred on payment of the checks was dependent on subsequent
events. This the court renders immaterial by its construction of the word
"loss." The logical result of the view taken in the case would be that, even
if the depositor had e-xpressly rather than impliedly ratified the payment,
indeed even if no recredit had been made, the defendant would be liable for
the amount of the forged checks; no event subsequent to the payment could
affect its liability. Refusing to proceed to this length,20 the court is in a
dilemma. If it were a new question, the court's construction of the word
"loss" might perhaps find justification in the words of the policy, but the
parties should be deemed to have contracted with reference to the prevailing
view that "loss" in an indemnity contract means only final, legal, actual
loss to the indemnitee.
TA:x DODGING BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF FuTUR INCOMaE
A PRESENT irrevocable assignment of a property right productive of future
income which effectively divests the assignor of all beneficial interest and
control has been said to relieve the assignor of tax responsibility for such
income.1 An ingenious attempt to avoid taxation by such an assignment
appears in the recent case of Leydig v. Conmvissioner of Intcnal RCVcmtC.2
There the petitioner, in consideration of one dolor and love and affection,
conveyed to his wife by a written assignment a one-half interest in the
oil and gas royalties reserved under an existing lease and to be reserved
under contemplated future leases. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
ruled that despite the assignment all the royalties were taxable to the
petitioner; but the Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld this ruling only as to the income received from the leases merely
contemplated and not yet executed at the time of the assignment.
It seem* clear that since the assignment of a share of the royalties to
accrue under the existing lease operated in pracscidi to transfer irrevocably
a half interest in the existing contract right to future income arising
therefrom, the assignor was improperly assessed on the share assigned.
The assignment of the royalties to accrue under the contemplated leases,
however, was an assignment not of a present interest, but of a mere pos-
isFirst National Bank v. Farrell, 272 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921);
Fletcher American National Bank v. Crescent Paper Co., 193 Ind. 329, 139
N. E. 664 (1923); Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63
N. E. 969 (1902).
19 Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96, 6 Sup. Ct. 657
(1886); Pannonia Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Side Trust Co., 93 N. J.
L. 377, 108 4tl. 240 (1919).; 2 MoRSE, BANKS AND BANKING (0th ed. 1928)
§ 472.
20 "The present record does not call upon us to decide what the rights of
the parties would be in a case where the forgery had been expressly ratified
before claim was made under the policy. Here the loss has been . . .
assumed by or clearly fixed upon the bank." 44 F. (2d) at 513.
'Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Field, 4Z F. (2) 820 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930) (assignment of the income of a trust fund by the beneficiary);
Shelabarger v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); Com-
ment (1929) 38 YAE L. J. 1123.
2 43 F. (2) 494 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
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sibility or expectancy not coupled with an interest.3 Assignments of mere
possibilities are generally held to be enforceable in equity as between the
parties,4 if for a valuable consideraton, where the parties intend to create
a lien on, or a transfer of, property 6 reasonably expected to be acquired
and capable of identification.7 Thus mortgages and assignments of after-
acquired property,8 of inheritance expectancies, 9 and of future book ac-
counts,10 have been deemed valid and enforceable 11' as equitable assign-
ments of the present possibility, taking effect automatically, without the
intervention of any new act, the moment the property interest comes into
existence.= An assignment prior to the acquisition of the property interest
has generally been said to be merely an executory contract to convey;' 3
yet, since no-new act is necessary to effectuate a transfer, it would seem
that the assignee obtains at the time of the assignment not merely a con-
tract right enforceable by specific performance, but also something in the
nature of an equitable title to, or lien on, the property, 4 which is per-
3 But see Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926) (assignment
of royalties to accrue under a future lease); Frazier v. Halon Gasoline
Co., 29 S. W. (2d) 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). (assignment of profits
from future sales of water).
4 Smithurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq. 408 (1862) ; Field v. City of New
York, 6 N. Y. 179 (1852). Contra: Wilcox v. Deines, 230 N. W. 682
<Neb. 1930); O'Neil v. Helmke, 124 Wis. 234, 102 N. W. 573 (1905).
5 In re Landis, 41 F. (2) 700 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); In re Lennig's
Estate, 182 Pa. 485, 38 Atl. 466 (1897).6 Barnes v. Shattuck, 13 Ariz. 338, 114 Pac. 952 (1911), aff'd, Barnes
v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117, 34 Sup. Ct. 276 (1914); 1 LAWRENCE, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (1929) § 275.
7 Seymour v. Canandaigna & Niagara Falls R. R., 25 Barb. 284 (N. Y.
1857); Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Woodring, 116 Pa, 513, 9 Atl. 58 (1887);
cf. McDonald v. Phillips, 100 Tex. 73, 94 S. W. 1131 (1906).
8 Central Trust Co. v. Kneeland, 138 U. S. 414 (1891); Holroyd v.
Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 209 (1862); cf. Emerson v. E. & N. A. Ry., 67
Me. 387 (1877) ; JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 205.
0 Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 397, 129 At. 504 (1925) ; Bacon v. Bonham, 33
N. J. Eq. 614 (1881). Contra: Flatt v. Flatt, 189 Kyj 801, 225 S. W.
1067 (1920).
10 Preston National Bank v. Smith Purifier Co., 84 Mich. 364, 47 N. W.
502 (1890); Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888). Contra:
Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43 (1917); see
Glenn, Book Accounts as Collateral (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 809.
n Assignments of future wages, however, are not enforceable unless
made under an existing contract of employment. Raulines v. Levi, 232
Mass. 42, 121 N. E. 500 (1919); Heller v. Lutz, 245 Mo. 704, 164 S. W.
123 (1914). Contra: Edwards v. Peterson, 80 Me. 367, 14 AtI. 936 (1888);
of. Holt v. American Woolen Co., 129 Me. 108, 150 Atl. 382 (1930).
32 McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459 (1875); In re Lind, [1915] 2 Ch.
345; BIsIPAm, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (10th ed. 1922) § 165. But of. RE:-
STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst.. 1928) § 154.
"3 Lewisburg Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96 (1879); Keys v.
Keys, supra note 9; 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) §
1395.
24 Thompson Yards v. Richardson, 51 N. D. 241, 199 N. W. 863 (1924);
In re Lind, supra note 12; BISHPAN, op. cit. supra note 12; 3 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1287. Contra: RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 154.
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fected when the assignor obtains possession of the property.XS According
to this view, in the instant case the income subsequently arising from
the royalties reserved under the contemplated lease was income received
from an irrevocably assigned property interest over which the assignor
had no control,1G and consequently was not taxable to the assignor.27
The decision, however, is indicative of a tendency of the federal courts
to nullify devices intended to reduce surtaxes by distributing the income
among more than one recipient.8 The absence, therefore, of an actual
existing "property" interest, as distinguished from a merely "equitable"
interest, when coupled with the retention of control by the petitioner, as
measured by his power to refuse to enter into the contemplated lease,,1
affords further justification for the refusal of the court to indulge "at-
tenuated subtleties" 20 for the purpose of deflecting tax responsibility.
DISPARITY OF FEDERAL TAx INCIDENCE RESULTING FROM DIVISION OF INco E
UNDER COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAws
THE property laws of eight' of the United States, under which property
acquired by a husband or wife is owned jointly by the marital community,
have conferred an extrinsic benefit upon the married residents of those
states as a result of the policy of allowing federal income tax returns to be
filed by each spouse for one half the community income.2 The controversy
provoked by the discrimination against married residents of other states
implicit in this practice was revived by the case of United States v. Rob-
bins,3 which held that since the laws of California, in contradistinction to
is On this basis the assignee's right would not be affected by the assignor's
subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126
Pac. 149 (1912); Roberts & Co. v. McDougal, 200 Inl. App. 583 (1916).
Contra: In re Lineberry, 183 Fed. 338 (N. D. Ala. 1910). See (1930)
43 HARV. L. REv. 290; (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 1197.
Cf. Young v. Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. N. J. 1928); O'Malley-
Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436 (D. Conn. 1928).
17 Further support for this view is found in the fact that since in the
"community-property" states husband and wife are permitted to divide
income and file separate tax returns, it would be more equitable to allow
those in other states not having community property statutes to do like-
wise on some such theory as this. See (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 665.
IS Cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930) (revocable
assignment of future income); Lucas v. Earle, 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct.
241 (1930) (assignment of future income); Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d)
450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), afd, 26 (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (assign-
ment of future profits); Note (1930) HARV. L. REv. 1282.
See Poe v. Seaborn, 51 Sup. Ct. 58, 61 (U. S. 1930); ROBINSON, SAVING
TAxEs IN DRAFTING WILLs AND TRusTs (1930) 250.
20 Lucas v. Earle, supra note 18.
IArizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington. For the origin and general tax problems of the system, see
Smith, The Community Property Buvgle (1929) 7 NAT. INCOME T, X AL*G.
63, 64.
2 Cf. T. D. 3071, 22 TREAS. DEC. 456 (1920); T. D. 3138, 23 TnRms. DEC.
238 (1921) ; T. D. 3295, 24 TRuAS. DEC. 207 (1922). Thus where the income
of the marital community has been provided solely by the husband, a
saving of from twenty-five to forty-one per cent has been effected by so.
reducing the net income of the husband'as to bring it within a lower
bracket of the graduated tax. See Smith, op. cit. supra note 1, at 67.
3 269 U. S. 315, 46 Sup. Ct. 148 (1926). Following this decision, the
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those of the other community-property states, gave the wife a mere expec-
tancy rather than a present vested interest in the community property, the
lhusband was required to file a tax return covering the entire community
income. The opinion of the court went so far as to assert that even though the
wife had a vested interest in the income, since the husband alone had control
of the fund, Congress had the power to tax him for the whole. 4 The effect
of this dictum was to create an impression that the basis of previous
treasury-department rulings was overthrown,5 and, in order to secure judi-
cial determination of the question, the Attorney General recently directed
the institution of test suits in each of the states affected.0 In Poe V. Sea-
born,7 the first of these cases to reach the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Roberts in his initial opinion as a member of that tribunal upheld the tax-
payer's contention that the Revenue Act established ownership, not control,
as the test of taxability, and concluded that since under the state law
.involved the wife had a vested right in the community income, her report
of half such income was proper.
Where income is derived from property, uniformity in federal revenue
exaction is presently possible, since in the non-community states an assign-
ment of such property would effect the same result as in the community-
property states.8 But in the taxing of earnings the discrimination is ap-
parent, for in the absence of a present property interest at the time of
transfer, the assignor of future income is held responsible for the tax
thereon.9 The position of the government in these test cases, however, that
the entire community income is taxable to the husband, while achieving
uniformity in situations where the income is earned solely by the husband,
merely shifts the advantage to the non-community states where each spouse
contributes earned income. 0 The court in the instant case might well have
interpreted the provision "tax . . on the income of every individual" 11 to
California Civil Code was amended to give the wife a present vested interest.
See infra note 7.
- Ibid. 327, 46 Sup. Ct. at 149.
5 Cf. Appeal of Ramming, 6 B. T. A. 188 (1926); Appeal of Rigsby, 6
B. T. A. 194 (1926). As a result of the uncertainty thus created, Congress
inserted § 1212 in the Revenue Act of 1926, resolving the question as to
prior years. 44 STAT. 130 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 964(a) (1926).
0 See 35 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 264 (1927). Cases have already been decided in
favor of the taxpayer in Washington, Arizona, Texas, Louisiana and Cali-
fornia. See infra note 7. For a detailed account of events leading up to
these cases, see Weeks, The Com'munity Income Tax, Test Cas-es (1929) 7
NAT. INCOME TAx MAG. 466.
7 51 Sup. Ct. 58 (U. S. 1930). Three other test suits were decided the
same day on the authority of the Seaborn case: Goodell v. Koch, 51 Sup.
Ct. 62 (U. S. 1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 51 Sup. Ct. 62 (U. S. 1930); Ben-
der v. Pfaff, 51 Sup. Ct. 64 (U. S. 1930). The agreed statement of facts
in each of these cases was the same. Since the decisions in these cases,
§ 161 (a) of the California Civil Code has been construed to effect the
same result in California. United States v. Malcolm, U. S. Daily, Jan.
20, 1931, at 3523.
8 See Smith, op cit. supra note 1, at 67.
!D Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930). See (1931)
40 YALE L. J. 663.
10 See Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Income (1929) 4 WASIL.
L. REv. 145, 152. Such a holding would also create non-uniformity with
respect to income derived from property.
II § 210 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926. 44 STAT 21 (1926), 26 U. S, C.
A. § 951(n) (1926).
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place the responsibility, at least for earned income, on the one who actually
receives such income. Congress may alter the wording of the section to
give effect to such a policy,- but so long as ownership remains the test of
taxability, the best solution would seem to lie in the taxation of every
married couple as a unit.'3 Under the decision in the Scaborn case the
application of the federal income tax remains dependent upon state property
laws designed for a wholly unrelated situation.
CoNsTTUTIONALrrY OF EXPERT WrrNEss STATUTES
IN 1910 the Supreme Court of Michigan faced the problem of determining
the constitutionality of a statute empowering a trial court in criminal
cases of homicide to appoint not more than three suitable, disinterested
persons to investigate and testify concerning issues involving expert knowl-
edge or opinion.' Seemingly the court had little doubt of the proper
answer. It found that the statute violated the due process clause of the
Michigan Constitution in that it interferred with the duties of the prose-
cuing attorney, that such an appointment was in no sense a judicial act,
that the reasons impelling the selection of experts would never be known,
that their names could not be indorsed on the indictment by the prosecut-
ing attorney as required by law, that the accused would not know in
advance who were to testify against him, that for the court to give this
added significance to the testimony of certain witnesses was to subvert
the very foundations of justice.2 Certain underlying assumptions, ordinarily
kept implicit, appeared toward the close of the opinion: while not over-
looking the evils of expert testimony in the insanity defense, the court
felt that the true remedy lay in the "development of a livelier sense of
responsibility to the public" on the part of the legal and medical pro-
fessions and not "in revolutionary legislation."
In the succeeding twenty years the defense of insanity has attracted
widespread public attention as one of the weakest spots in the adminis-
tration of our criminal justice.3 And the spectacle of privately paid expert
witnesses testifying to quite opposite conclusions has presented the issue
to the public in perhaps the most shocking fashion.' The agitation for such
an obvious and comparatively simple reform has grown with the year&
Several model bills have been proposed, one by the American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology, and legislation has now been adopted
12 Cf. (1930) 8 Tnx. L. REv. 610.
3 See Alaggs, Community Property and the Fedcral Inccnze Taz (1920)
14 CALIF. L. REv. 351, 448. Congress has the power to treat as a unit for
income tax purposes an association not recognized by the state as a unit
for purposes of ownership of property. Cf. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v.
Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct 48 (1925).
'People v. Dickerson, 164 Mlich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910). It was also
provided that the fact of appointment should be made known to the jury
and that neither the prosecution nor the defense should be excluded from
calling other expert witnesses.
2The court cites very little authority having any bearing on these points.
3 See SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DIsoRDER AND THE CnIiiNALr LAW
(1925); S. Glueck & E. Glueck, Predictability in Criminal Justice (1929)
42 HARV. L. REV. 297; Nelson, The Need for Statutory Psychiatric Examina-
tion in Criminal Cases (1926) 11 ST. Louis L. RBv. 284.
4 See William A. White, Expert Testhny in Criminal Procedure (1921)
11 J. CRmI. L. 499. An obvious example is the Loeb-Leopold case.
5 Ibid. See also Stevens, Expert Testinony (1919) 10 J. Cnm. L. 188.
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in a number of states.0 Recently in Jessner v. State T the Wisconsin
Supreme Court faced much the same constitutional question as had con-
fronted the Michigan court twenty years previously. Here the statute
contained an additional provision allowing the judge, after reasonable
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to commit the accused to a state
hospital for observation by the expert witnesses of all partiess After
paying an ominous compliment to counsel for the defense the court swept
aside an imposing array of constitutional objections with a certain inevit-
able precision.
To the argument that the statute imposed upon the trial court a non-
judicial function the court replied with ample show of authority 9 that the
appointing power was often granted as incident to the judicial power and
that in this particular instance it was appropriately adapted to the "very pur-
poses for which courts are established." A similar contention that the statute
was an invasion "of the province of the district attorney the court dismissed
summarily with the statement that not only did the statute not interfere
with the district attorney but that to disallow a reform in judicial pro-
cedure because the constitution established such an office would be to give
"a most remote and fanciful potency" to that document.10 More significant,
especially as it concerns future developments of a more radical nature,
was the objection that the provision compelling the accused to submit to
observation violated constitutional guaranties against self-incrimination.
Here the court, citing instances of minor incroachments upon the guaranty,1"
relied upon the consent of the accused to the examination and refrained
from any further attempt to set limits to his rights in this respect. Had
it wished, however, the court might have pointed to a number of decisions
of the United States Supreme Court 12 and a majority of state courts 1
r CAL. STAT. ANN. (1929) c. 385, p. 702; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp.
1929) § 2291; OHIO CRIM. CODE (Patterson, 1929) § 13441-4; N. Y. CONS.
LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 31, § 31; R. I. GEN LAWS (1923) c. 342, §§ 18, 19;
WIS. STAT. (1929) 357.12 (1)-(4). The New York and Rhode Island
statutes were in existence at the time of the Michigan decision. The
California and Indiana statutes make the appointment of experts mandatory
when the defense of insanity is pleaded.
7 231 W. W. 634 (Wis. 1930).
8 The statute also expressly provided for cross-examination of the court's
witnesses, notice of the appointment, and an opportunity for a hearing.
Possibly these provisions effectually silenced the due process argument, for
it was not raised in the Wisconsin case.
9 E.g., Foster v. Rowe, 128 Wis. 326, 107 N. W. 635 (1906), 8 Ann.
Cas. 595 (1908) (permitting circuit judges to appoint commissioners to
equalize count of valuations of property for taxation). Note also People
v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 Pac. 583 (1923); People v. White, 334 Ill. 465,
166 N. E. 100 (1929).
10 Cf. Ex parte Peterson, infra note 21, where the court argued that old
forms of procedure could be changed without violating constitutional rights.
11 Such as requiring the accused to remove his hat, or to deliver his shoes
to witnesses for the purpose of comparing them with footprints found
near the scene of the crime.
12 Cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910).
13 Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926) ; People v. Furlong, 187
N. Y. 198, 79 N. E. 978 (1907); State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So.
655 (1927); cf. Thornton v. State, 117 Wis. 338, 93 N. W. 1107 (1903);
6 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§ 2265; 2220 (4); (1930) 24 ILL. L. Ray.
487; (1929)- 29 COL. L. RaV. 214.
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admitting in evidence facts ascertained by mental or physical examina-
tion of the accused without his consent or over his objection.24
Concerning the relation of the statute to constitutional guaranties of
jury trial two approaches led divergent ways. The defense offered eases
to show that under the modern institution of jury trial it was error for
the trial judge to give any indication, more particularly by comment, of
the weight he considered due the testimony of any witness.'5 The court
chose a more conservative argument to reach a more liberal conclusion.
Making no attempt to distinguish the defendant's cases, it cited others to
show that the "jury" of the constitution was the jury as it existed at the
adoption of the constitution,1 6 proved that at common law the judge could
express his opinion of the merits of the case,. 7 and concluded that the
right to trial by an impartial jury had not been infringed.
In no other case has the constitutionality of an expert witness statute
been squarely considered. Louisiana has held that the state cannot object
to a statute making the finding of a commission on a plea of insanity
conclusive when such finding is against the state, 8 but that to make it
conclusive when against the accused is a violation of his constitutional
rights.19 The validity of the Massachusetts statute providing for com-
pulsory examination by a commission of persons accused of certain crimes
and the admission of the commission's report in evidence does not appear
to have been questioned.20 There are several instances, however, where
the appointment of an expert witness by the trial judge has been ap-
proved.2 In view of the serious pressure for reform, the importance of
preparing a way for more radical changes in the future, and the small
likelihood of prejudice to the accused in the present statute, it is not sur-
prising to find the Wisconsin court at complete odds with the earlier Michi-
gan decision.
14 The court refused to pass upon the argument of the state that the con-
stitutional provision did not apply to the question of the defendant's sanity
at all. Cf. State v. Lange, infra note 18.
35 The court admitted that that "tendency" prevailed in Wisconsin. Bene-
dict v. State, 14 Wis. 423 (1861); Ryan v. State, 168 Wis. 14, 168 N. W.
566 (1918). This is the rule in many states by statute.
16 Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912 (1883). Note also White
v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917), L. R. A. 1918A 339 (1918);
Matter of Perkins, 105 Misc. 534, 173 N. Y. Supp. 520 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
17 Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 7 Sup. Ct. 1
(1886). Note also Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145 (1899);
Garst v. United States, 180 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910).
18 State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
19 State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 125 So. 580 (1929). Apparently it was
contemplated that the report of the commission be admitted in evidence,
however.
2o Mass. Acts 1921, c. 415, § 10OA, amended by Mass. Acts 1929, e. 105.
The statute was involved in Commonwealth v. Deveraux, 257 Mass. 391,
153 N. E. 881 (1926).
21 People v. Linton, 283 Pac. 389 (Cal. App. 1929) (insanity); State v.
Home, 171 N. C. 787, 88 S. E. 433 (1916) (murder trial, issue involving
expert not disclosed); cf. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct.
543 (1920) (auditor to examine books).
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